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SHAYANA KADIDAL*
What are the implications for civil liberties of the massive
surveillance programs that have come to public attention as a result of
Edward Snowden's disclosures? The first challenge for anyone
attempting to unravel this issue is the natural tendency of the public
to shrug' at the volume and complexity of the information flooding
out 11 from both Snowden and other official sources that have started
to speak to the media under the cover of his disclosures. The stories
are rapidly evolving, and frankly, complex enough to confuse anyone.
But in my view, the greatest contributor to the apparent complexity is
the maze of ever-shifting, always highly technical legal justifications
for the various programs at issue. In what follows, I will argue that the
actual surveillance taking place is remarkably consistent from the
Bush administration to the present day; although the legal rationales
for the surveillance programs are protean, the programs themselves-
and therefore their implications for civil liberties-are largely
consistent. It is therefore both more enlightening (and simpler) to
start a few years in the past, when most of us first heard about the
National Security Agency (NSA), in late 2005 when James Risen and
Eric Lichtblau of the New York Times broke the story2 that the NSA
was collecting large quantities of calls and emails without getting
* Senior Managing Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City; J.D., Yale,
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proven incorrect, of the author.
1 In internet terms, "TL;DR.".
2 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y. TJMES
(Dec. 16, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2005/12/16/polities/i6program.html?pagewanted=all.
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approval from a court first, as usually happens with a conventional
wiretap warrant.
1. 21 ST CENTURY SURVEILLANCE: A BRIEF HISTORY
After holding the story for more than a year-past the 2004
presidential election-the Times finally published it in December
2005, shortly before Risen's book State of War (which included a
chapter on the program) was scheduled for publication. Being the
product of such a lengthy period of reporting, the story was rich in
detail, but the main revelation was that the NSA, with presidential
approval, has since shortly after 9/11 been intercepting calls and
emails where one communicant was inside the U.S. and one abroad,
where it believed that one of the parties was somehow affiliated with
terrorism, all without any warrants or degree of judicial review
whatsoever. The story was reported as an example of blatant
lawlessness, for this "NSA Program" or "Program" (as I will call it
throughout) appeared to circumvent the post-Watergate Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that was designed to subject most
foreign intelligence wiretapping to a system of judicial review similar
to that that had applied to domestic wiretaps for criminal
investigatory purposes since the 1968 Wiretap Act ("Title III").
Indeed, the Bush Administration, which chose to aggressively defend
the Program in the media, admitted as much: surveillance under the
Program was of the sort that ordinarily would have been subject to
FISA.3
That 1978 FISA statute, by appearances, was quite permissive: If
the government could provide to the specialized Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) evidence creating probable cause to suspect
that a target was working for a foreign power (defined to include
terrorist groups), it could get a FISA order-essentially, a wiretap
warrant-allowing surveillance of that target's communications. In
practice as well as in theory it seemed easy enough for the government
to use: There were only five outright rejections among the first 22,987
applications after 1978.4 Though the administration would argue that
3 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Center for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, No.
13-802 (Jan. 2, 2014), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Center%2ofor%20Constitutional%2ORights%2Ov%20%20
ObamaPetition%2ofor%2oWrit.pdf.
4 See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 3, at 5; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court
Orders 1979-2012, Electronic Privacy Information Center (May 1, 2014),
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html. It does appear that the process
before the FISC occasionally results in modifications of the initial applications; this
occurred in roughly 2% of the applications submitted in 2012, for instance. Id.
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judicial approval stood in the way of "speed and agility" in tracking
down targets,' like Title III the original 1978 FISA provided for
retroactive judicial approval in the event of emergencies. And in any
event, the administration never asked a rather pliant Congress for
approval of changes to the FISA statute, instead proceeding by
executive fiat.
The political shockwaves the story generated were largely a
consequence of this gross illegality; indeed the administration's spin
seemed to project pride in its willingness to break the law, which
added to the unease in my own community of civil libertarian
litigators. Why not use FISA if the statute was that easy to work with?
Our main suspicion at the time was that the administration was trying
to eavesdrop on communications that even a very compliant FISC
judge would not approve of intercepting: conversations between
lawyers and their clients, journalists and their sources. The
description of the program-international calls and emails, with one
end in the U.S., where one party was suspected (by an NSA staffer, not
necessarily based on any tangible evidence) of association with
terrorism-fit a vast quantity of our legally-privileged
communications. The Center for Constitutional Rights's (CCR) legal
staff frequently calls or emails released Guantanamo detainees, their
families, or witnesses relevant to their cases, or other overseas lawyers
and experts. We also represented torture rendition victim Maher Arar,
who lived in Canada at the time of the disclosures, having been
released after a year of torture in Syria at the behest of our
government, and representatives of a class of immigration detainees
unfairly labeled as of interest to the 9/11 investigation, subject to over-
long detention under brutal conditions, and subsequently deported
overseas. They were all potential targets of the program, and though
we need to communicate with them, we felt we had to take costly and
burdensome countermeasures (such as traveling overseas to meet in
person rather than using the phone) given the existence of this
judicially-unsupervised program of surveillance (which by definition
did not operate under any judicially-supervised minimization
procedures that might otherwise protect plaintiffs' legally privileged
communications6 ). We felt the costs created by those counter-
measures, the concrete manifestations of the chilling effect cast by the
NSA Program, were sufficient to create injury-in-fact for standing
5 Press Release, The White House, Setting the Record Straight: Critics Launch Attacks
Against Program to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Attacks (Jan. 4, 2oo6), available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/ol/wholo4o6.html.
6 On minimization of legally-privileged communications, see infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
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purposes, so CCR brought suit seeking to enjoin the Program;7 the
ACLU brought a similar suit (on behalf of itself, other lawyers, and
journalists) on the same day in January 2oo6.8
However, there were clues even then that this targeted NSA
Program was only one aspect of the NSA's expanded post-9/11
surveillance activities. Risen and Lichtblau's initial story-and later
others-reported, based on inside NSA sources, that there was a "data
mining" component to the program-meaning, essentially, that the
NSA was intercepting electronic communications (calls and emails) in
a general fashion, not a targeted one, and then either scanning the
content of those communications for the presence of certain keywords
thought to be themselves suspicious, or applying more complex
algorithms to that huge database to flag communications or the
parties thereto for further scrutiny. To use a simple example of the
latter, suppose a call comes in to a U.S. number from Afghanistan in
the middle of the night, and the person called then calls five other
people within an hour. A mechanical algorithm can easily identify
such situations (even where there was no prior reason to suspect any
of the persons on the calls) and flag them for further review. The
pattern the algorithm identifies may be characteristic of sleeper cells
triggered to action; it may also be characteristic of a family wedding
announcement being passed along to close relatives.
Within short order, a case was filed seeking damages against
AT&T based on what appeared to be its complicity in just such a
massive data-mining operation against its own customers. 9 An AT&T
employee whistleblower, Mark Klein, had disclosed to attorneys at the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) the existence of a secret room in
AT&T's Folsom St., San Francisco switching station. It appeared that a
copy of every electronic communication coming in off the fiber optic
undersea cables that entered AT&T's domestic system through the
Folsom St. station was being sent off to the NSA through the
equipment installed in the secret room; the only people who would
enter the room were NSA staffers and one AT&T employee who held
the highest security clearance. The complaint in the Electronic
Frontier Foundation's case, Hepting v. AT&T, also alleged that AT&T
had turned over its vast call records database to the government too-
7 CCR v. Obama, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2013), http://ccrjusfice.org/CCR-
v-Obama.
8 ACLUv. NSA: The Challenge to Illegal Spying, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (2008),
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-v-nsa-challenge-illegal-spying.
9 Hepting v. AT&T, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (2012),
https://www.eff.org/cases/hepting.
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something which USA Today first reported was true of all three U.S.-
owned telecom companies in May 2006.1
In CCR's case and the ACLU case, the government challenged our
standing, essentially asserting that if we had no evidence that we (or
our other plaintiffs) were actually surveilled, our claims that we
changed the way we use the phone and email because of the NSA
Program's chilling effect were legally insufficient to support standing.
But one group actually did have proof that they were surveilled. Al
Haramain, an Oregon branch of an international Muslim charity, had
been placed on the list of "Specially Designated Global Terrorist[s]"
"due to the organization's alleged ties to Al Qaeda . . . [D]uring Al-
Haramain's civil designation proceeding," Treasury officials
inadvertently turned over to the organization's counsel a document
labeled "top secret." "[A]fter The New York Times' story broke in
December 2005, [Al-Haramain] realized that the ... [d]ocument was
proof that it had been subjected to warrantless surveillance in March
and April of 2004."" Published accounts state that this document
provided evidence that the NSA had intercepted communications
between an official of Al-Haramain and the charity's American
lawyers, Wendell Belew and Asim Ghafoor," whose practices are
located in the Washington D.C. area-the sort of surveillance retention
of which would surely never be approved by a federal judge
supervising a wiretapping order under the original FISA statute or
Title III (absent an active role in some criminal conspiracy by the
attorneys on the line), exactly the sort of communications we feared
the NSA might have been targeting given its circumvention of the
permissive FISA statute. This was not the only evidence supporting
fears that attorneys' privileged communications were subject to
warrantless surveillance: the Bush administration acknowledged in a
formal 2007 submission to Congress that, "[a]lthough the [NSA]
program does not specifically target the communications of attorneys
or physicians, calls involving such persons would not be categorically
10 See Complaint at para. 39-40, Hepting v. AT&T, No. C-o6-672-JCS (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
2oo6), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/att-complaint.pdf; Amended
Complaint at para. 53-61, Hepting v. AT&T, No. C-o6-672-JCS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2oo6),
available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/att-complaint amended.pdf.
" Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 119o, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2007).
12 See Patrick Radden Keefe, State Secrets: A Government Misstep in a Wiretapping Case,
THE NEWYORKER, Apr. 28, 2008, 28-34; Jon B. Eisenberg, Suing George W. Bush: A
bizarre and troubling tale, SALON.COM (July 9, 2OO8),
http://www.salon.Com/2oo8/o7/o9/alharamain-lawsuit/.
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excluded from interception."'3 And in 20o8 the New York Times
reported "[t]he Justice Department does not deny that the
government has monitored phone calls and e-mail exchanges between
lawyers and their clients as part of its terrorism investigations in the
United States and overseas," and the Times further reported that
"[t]wo senior Justice Department officials" admitted that "they knew
of... a handful of terrorism cases.., in which the government might
have monitored lawyer-client conversations. 4 In CCR's own litigation
challenging the NSA Program, the government conceded before the
district court that it would be a "reasonable inference" to conclude
from these statements of government officials "that some attorney-
client communications may have been surveilled under" the
Program."
Two months after we sued, Al-Haramain and the two U.S.
attorneys sued seeking damages. After years of litigation, the Ninth
Circuit found the document protected by the state secrets privilege:
notwithstanding its accidental and seemingly negligent disclosure, it
was still classified top secret-still a state secret-and could not be used
in litigation. Put to one side the original copy of the document, now
filed with the court-even the attorneys' memories of the document
could not be referred to; the proof of surveillance missing from our
case was held to be secret and thus entirely unavailable to the
Plaintiffs. 6 After further proceedings, the lower court nonetheless
found that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of unlawful
surveillance based on circumstantial evidence effectively uncontested
by the government, and awarded damages and attorneys' fees, but
that ruling was overturned on sovereign immunity grounds by the
13 Responses to Joint Questions from House Judiciary Committee Minority Members,
Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella at 15, 45 (Mar. 24, 2oo6), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/ agency/doj/fisa/doj0324o6.pdf.
14 Philip Shenon, Lawyers Fear Monitoring in Cases on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2oo8, at A14.
15 See Defendant's Reply Brief at 4, Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 07-1115
(N.D. Cal.) at 4.
16 Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1193 ("we reverse the [district] court's order allowing A-
Haramain to reconstruct the essence of the document through memory. Such an approach
countenances a back door around the privilege and would eviscerate the state secret
itself."); id. at 1204 ("[The district court's] approach also suffers from a worst of both
world's deficiency: either the memory is wholly accurate, in which case the approach is
tantamount to release of the document itself, or the memory is inaccurate, in which case
the court is not well-served and the disclosure may be even more problematic from a
security standpoint.").
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Ninth Circuit. 7 The case EFF filed against AT&T sought damages, and
it died when Congress passed a retroactive immunity statute, though
otherwise they might well have ended up with the same problem as Al
Haramain given the whistleblower documents' centrality to the
claims.
As to our cases, seeking to enjoin the program, the government
very aggressively defended the program in public and in court, but
then shifted tactics by convincing a FISC judge to approve the whole
program by January 2007, just in time to abort the first court of
appeals argument challenge in the ACLU case. Different FISC judges
reviewed the initial January 2007 order or orders and rejected what
the first more pliant judge had approved of;8 that, in turn, finally
provoked the Bush Administration to seek approval from Congress for
the NSA's program of surveillance without individualized judicial
review of targeting decisions. That approval came first in the form of a
temporary statute, allowing the government to seek broad approval
for whole programs of surveillance (without individualized review of
targets) from the FISC for a six-month period. That authority expired
in early 2oo8, with the presidential campaigns well underway.
By the summer of 2oo8 the Bush Administration gained lasting
Congressional approval to change the post-Watergate-era FISA statute
beyond recognition, so that the government would propose a whole
program of surveillance to one FISC judge, who would then check off
on the whole thing if it seemed designed to sweep in primarily foreign
communications. Essentially this was a codification of the existing
NSA Program with a veneer of judicial review. Under the 2008 FISA
Amendments Act (FAA) the government submits to a FISC judge for
approval "targeting procedures" that are "reasonably designed" to
ensure that the acquisition is "limited to targeting persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States" (and correspondingly
to exclude communications where all parties are known to be inside
the U.S.)' 9 There need be no specification of individual targets or the
facilities, phone lines, or emails to be targeted-essentially dispensing
with the traditional particularity requirement entirely. While the
government must submit minimization procedures, the statute does
not specify what role the FISC has in reviewing them, or whether in
17 A1-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 69o F.3d 1o89, 1o99 (9th Cir. 2012).
18 See, e.g., Greg Miller, New Limits Put on Overseas Surveillance, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2007, at A16 (reporting that second FISAjudge rejected "basket warrants," allowing
surveillance without particularized suspicion, that had been previously approved by first
judge. Apparently, "[o]ne FISAjudge approved this, and then a second one didn't.").
19 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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practice the FISC has any role in overseeing their implementation.20
As the ACLU summarized it:
The judiciary's traditional function under the Fourth
Amendment is to serve as a gatekeeper for particular
acts of surveillance, but its function under the FAA is
simply to issue advisory opinions blessing in advance
the vaguest of parameters under which the government
is then free to conduct surveillance for up to one year.
The FISA Court does not consider individualized and
particularized surveillance applications, does not make
individualized probable cause determinations, and ...
may not monitor compliance with targeting and
minimization procedures.2'
When Senator (and presidential candidate) Obama switched his
position and voted in favor of that statute, the FAA, he effectively
removed surveillance from the public political debate for the next five
years, because it was no longer a bone of contention between the
parties.
The ACLU challenged the FAA in court an hour after it was signed
into law, claiming primarily that it violated the Fourth Amendment,
and that case, Clapper v. Amnesty International, went to the Supreme
Court on the same standing issue that the government had made its
primary defense to the 2oo6 cases brought by CCR and the ACLU
against the NSA Program. In a 5-4 decision, the ACLU lost: the Court
did not hold that chilling-effect surveillance plaintiffs need absolute
proof that they were surveilled, but it found that the ACLU's chilling-
effect fears were "too speculative" despite the fact that the FAA
allowed for very broad surveillance of international communications.
A major factor in the majority's reasoning seemed to be that the FISA
Court was supposedly2  reviewing each FAA application for
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, as the statute mandated, but
20 On minimization see infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
21 See Brief for Respondents at 13, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, No. 11-1025 (Sep. 17,
2012).
22 Of course, since "[t]he role that the FISA Court plays under the FAA bears no
resemblance to the role that it has traditionally played under FISA," id., the FAA having
dispensed with the particularity requirement of traditional search warrants and the
ongoing judicial supervision of minimization requirements, see infra note 98, it is unclear
what that Fourth Amendment compliance review would consist of in practice.
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the Supreme Court also questioned whether it was realistic to think
the ACLU plaintiffs' communications would be targeted and
intercepted as a factual matter. (The remnants of our original 2oo6
case, now in the Ninth Circuit on the issue of records retention by the
government, were dismissed as well, relying on Clapper.23 )
For future litigants resembling the CCR and ACLU plaintiffs, this
first round of NSA litigation set up a framework for any future
litigation that is essentially a Catch-22: where plaintiffs lack direct
evidence that they were surveillance targets (that is, where reasonable
measures taken in response to reasonable fears of very broad
surveillance are the only basis for a civil litigant's injury), they are
likely to be tossed out of court on standing grounds based on Clapper.
Where plaintiffs do, somehow, have direct evidence of past or present
surveillance, and try to bring a civil suit for damages or try to enjoin
interception or retention of records under the surveillance program
and have it declared illegal, the evidence of surveillance will be tossed
out of court as secret.
Of course-as the majority noted in Clapper-this leaves the
possibility that the government will seek to introduce evidence from
such surveillance in a criminal case, and the defendant will then be
able to litigate the validity of the surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment regardless of the statutory basis vel non of the
surveillance. In fact, Solicitor General Verilli specifically argued to the
Court that federal courts did not need to reach the merits of the ACLU
challenge precisely because the same issue would eventually come up
in some criminal case. Of course, that assumes the government wants
the issue to be litigated; a typical (strong) criminal case will rely on
many veins of evidence, not all of which will be fruits of initial NSA
surveillance, and if so, the government may choose its evidence to
avoid bringing NSA evidence into court. It is unclear that any previous
criminal case has challenged actual surveillance under the NSA
Program or any of the other programs reported on since the
Risen/Lichtblau story. We now know why: the government's
representation in Clapper that "it must provide advance notice of its
intent" to use "information obtained or derived from '24 FAA
surveillance has not extended to situations where it uses FAA
surveillance in applications to acquire traditional FISA surveillance
orders. According to the New York Times, only some four months
23 See Center for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 522 F. App'x 383 (9th Cir. 2013),pet'n
for reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, Order, Dkt. 50, No. 11-15956 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2013),
pet'n for cert. pending.
24 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, No. 11-1025 (Feb. 17,
2012).
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after this Court decided Amnesty did the Solicitor General learn that
his representations to this Court were in error, and only after lengthy
debate over the summer did the Justice Department reverse its
longstanding position and approve of informing defendants that the
fruits of FAA surveillance were used against them. 25 It remains to be
seen how frequent such notices will be in criminal cases,26 and to what
extent defendants are able to challenge the surveillance as a practical
matter.27
In any event, absent the odd criminal case that is entirely reliant
on evidence gathered by the NSA, such litigation will proceed only
when the government desires it to. The same could be said about other
cases involving proof of actual surveillance, such as Al-Haramain: if
the government wanted to litigate the legality of the NSA Program
surveillance of American attorneys, it had the option to not assert the
state secrets privilege there. In the current round of Snowden-inspired
litigation, the government has acknowledged the authenticity of the
Section 215 order allowing for mass gathering of calling records,
28
eliminating the ability of the government to hide behind the catch-22
described above by claiming the material was still secret, and enabling
the ACLU's litigation over that program to go forward on the merits.
Though this was likely necessary to justify the government's release of
a second order apparently limiting use of the records database, it
perhaps is a sign that the government (a) believes it will win and (b)
feels that it needs the political cover of a favorable ruling on the
legality of the call records program from a non-FISC judge.
25 Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2013, at A3.
26 For example, despite the fact that NSA intercepts are funneled to DEA agents, with the
DEA directed to conceal the origins of the information, see John Shiffman and Kristina
Cooke, U.S. Directs Agents to Cover up Program Used to Investigate Americans,
REUTERS, Aug. 5, 2013, available at http://vwwv.reuters.com/article/2o13/o8/o5/us-dea-
sod-idUSBRE97409R2013o8o5 (there is no reported instance of such disclosures
occurring to date in drug cases).
27 The first such acknowledgment occurred on October 25, 2013. Charlie Savage, Federal
Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.Com/2o13/1o/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-
cite-warrantless-wiretaps-as-
evidence.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit th 20131027&_r=o.
28 See Press Release, James R. Clapper, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information (June 6, 2013), available at
http://wwv.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/868-
dni-statement-on-recent-unauthorized-diselosures-of-classified-information.
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II. FROM RISEN/LICHTBLAU TO SNOWDEN: CURRENT-DAY PROGRAMS
Even this short history of NSA surveillance from 9/11 to early
2013, told through the litigation narrative, shows a pattern: similar
programs run under legal authority that shifts so dramatically that the
legal justification for the surveillance eventually comes to seem like an
afterthought, rather irrelevant to the (typically unbounded) shape of
the surveillance program itself.
So, initially after 9/11, the NSA's various warrantless surveillance
programs (some aimed at the content of communications like the NSA
program we challenged in our 2oo6 suit; others aimed at metadata
like the phone records program described in Hepting) operated under
nothing more than the authority of the president's say-so, backed by a
single Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum as cover. That
memo was shielded from the OLC's usual oversight processes by a
disingenuous use of security clearances to hide it from scrutiny. By
2004, Jack Goldsmith and James Comey forced some aspects of those
programs to stop, so the administration turned to National Security
Letters to run its metadata programs and changed others. 9 When the
Risen/Lichtblau story revealed some of the warrantless electronic
content surveillance programs, the administration first defended its
executive legal prerogatives shamelessly; then, confronted with a
Court of Appeals challenge, went to the FISC court for what turned out
to be a few months of reprieve, and when forced by the FISC's change
of heart, finally went to Congress to broaden the statute, first in
temporary sunsetting fashion, and then more permanently with the
FAA. As Marcy Wheeler summarizes it: "As the authorities [for] one
program got shut down by exposure or court rulings or internal
dissent, [the surveillance] would migrate to another program."3
In light of this pattern, it's probably not surprising that today the
stories speak not of one "NSA Program" but of a "crazy quilt"'" of code
names: "PRISM," "..BLARNEY," "ANGRY NEIGHBOR,"
"SHENANIGANS," "Transient Thurible," the palindromically-
29 See Yochai Benkler, How the NSA and FBI Foil Weak Oversight, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2o13/oct/16/nsa-fbi-endrun-weak-
oversight.
30 Marcy Wheeler, Bush's Illegal Domestic Surveillance Program and Section 215,
EMPTYWHEEL BLOG (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://emptywhee.firedoglake.COm/2009/10/07/bushs-illlegal-domestic-surveillance-
program-and-section-215//.
31 To paraphrase Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) ("We are not inclined to
make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment").
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menacing "EvilOlive," "Shell Trumpet," "Spinnaret,"
"WATERWITCH," "HOWLERMONKEY," and so forth. NSA
whistleblower Thomas Drake explains the profusion of such names by
analogy to the perceived need to come up with catchy company names
and job titles within startup/dot-com corporate culture, or "app"
names for the iPhone generation. In part because discussions
structured around particular programs as marketed within the NSA
are meaningless to what's going on, and in part because the confusion
engendered by all the flashy code names makes people tune out, I
want to simplify by classifying things into two main sets of programs:
those that collected the content of communications, and those that
collected non-content information about communications, the latter
generically referred to as "metadata"-roughly the letter and the
envelope, to use the most evocative metaphor.
A. Metadata Surveillance
The most publicized of the NSA's metadata programs was one
through which the agency, under section 215 of the Patriot Act, got a
series of court orders, repeatedly renewed over the years going back to
2oo6, allowing it to collect all phone records from Verizon (and likely
the two other domestically-owned32 phone providers, Sprint and
AT&T, as well).33 So the NSA requested and received from these
telecom companies, lists of all calls their subscribers made and
received, including typically-recorded metadata such as the time of
day, duration of the call, and the phone numbers on the other end of
the line (but not the content, i.e. what was said on the call).
The order published by the Guardian newspaper34 could be read
standing alone to simply demand that these records be turned over to
the NSA for whatever use they deem necessary. The administration
subsequently released other orders that indicated that the FISC orders
only permitted it to query the database of calling records so assembled
32 Danny Yadron and Evan Perez, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless Shielded from NSA Sweep,
WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424127887324o495o45785438oo24o26636
8. (Subsequent to the Snowden revelations, a majority stake in Sprint was purchased by
SoftBank, a Japanese telecom company.).
33 Indeed, the story was reported on as far back as 2006. See Leslie Cauley, NSA has
massive database ofAmericans'phone calls, USA TODAY (May 11, 2OO6),
http://usatoday3o.usatoday.com/news/washington/2oo6-05- o-nsa-x.htm.
34 Verizon forced to hand over telephone data-full court ruling, THE GUARDIAN (June 5,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2o13/jun/o6/verizon-telephone-
data-court-order.
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to investigate records of someone's calling patterns when "a small
circle of designated NSA officers" felt they had "reasonable articulable
suspicion" that that person had some connection to terrorism,3" but it
also admitted that it then scrutinized the calling records of everyone
that first person called, and everyone those people called. On Frigyes
Karinthy3 /Six-Degrees-of-Kevin-Bacon principles, that surely
includes a huge swath of humanity for each of the 300 individuals37
the NSA allegedly limited its phone database investigations to in 2012;
depending on input variables about the size of the typical
acquaintance pool, estimates have varied between 3 million and tens
of millions of people per target.38 Other metadata collection programs
have been disclosed since then, including a series of programs to
collect all web surfing data (that is, all internet addresses a consumer
visits), under the not-at-all sinister name EvilOlive. A firm picture of
how many steps out from an initial suspect the NSA will reach is not
clear for other metadata programs.39
The administration's defenses of the call records program as policy
have focused on both the limitations on querying the database
referred to above, and the idea that this information is the same data
35 Steven G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs, LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES (Sep. 1, 2013) available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/o8/Bradbury-Vol -No-3.pdf.
36 Frigyes Karinthy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.vikipedia.org/viki/Frigyes-Karinthy (last
visited Apr. 9, 2014).
37 See Klayman v. Obama, 2013 WL 6571596 at *7, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176925, *31-*32
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) ("In 2012, for example, fewer than 300 unique identifiers met this
RAS standard and were used as "seeds" to query the metadata, but "the number of unique
identifiers has varied over the years." Shea Deel. 24.").
38 See Three Degrees of Separation: Breaking Down the NSA 's 'hops' Surveillance Method,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2o13/oct/28/nsa-files-decoded-hops (at
typical 190-friend connection level of the average Facebook user, 3rd degree of separation
results in 5 million non-redundant "friends of friends of friends"; at 1000 friends, nearly 27
million people are three hops from the initial seed); see also Patrick C. Toomey, The NSA's
Shadow Database, ACLU BLOG (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security/nsas-shadow-database (suggesting that a duplicate database, consisting of all
records of users three hops removed from all seeds for whom reasonable articulable
suspicion existed, may then be searched by NSA without restriction).
39 See, e.g., Shane Harris, Three Degrees of Separation is Enough to Have You Watched by
the NSA, FOREIGN POLICY (July 17, 2013),
http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.Com/posts/2o13/O7/17/3-degrees-of separations-enoug
h to have-you watched by the nsa (three steps, citing testimony of NSA Deputy
Director Chris Inglis).
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that the private telecom companies already keep on their subscribers,
as they routinely track usage for billing purposes, the main differences
being duration of retention (the FCC requires no more than 18
months; the NSA claims it keeps these records no longer than five
years) and the fact that many companies' data are now accumulated
into one NSA database, allowing for a more complete picture of the
interrelationships between callers who subscribe to different
providers.
In some ways this defense points us towards the root of the real
problem for civil liberties. Private companies routinely accumulate
huge volumes of data about their consumers in order to sell them
more product: not just the usual corporate suspects like Google (who
can discern which banner ads are likely to get your attention for an
advertiser iand be useful to you-by scanning through your email to
tell what things are occupying your thoughts), but also your
supermarket or drug store. Those free loyalty cards that Duane Reade
urges consumers to sign up for are used to track a consumer's identity
and create a purchase history tied to that identity. The frequent
sizeable discounts given to cardholders on many goods are worth the
bargain for the merchant, who can then start targeting those
consumers with customized ads and discount offers to draw them
back into the store.40
Interestingly, the NSA, with access to many more streams of data,
may have been doing this on its own by pulling together many
consumer-purchase databases 41 with credit card records. The most
prominent example of a case NSA claims its newly-revealed
operations helped uncover, would-be New York City subway bomber
Najibullah Zazi, was said to be making TATP (acetone peroxide)
bombs with cosmetic peroxide. Early in the investigation the FBI cited
to three other individuals near Zazi's Colorado town who also bought
small quantities of acetone or peroxide; they were never mentioned by
40 See, e.g., Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REVIEW OF
BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/o9/how-your-
data-are-being-deeply-mined/?insrc=wci; Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen
Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/6/how-target-figured-out- a-teen-
girl-was -pregnant-before-her-father-did/.
41 It has frequently been noted that many consumer profiles available from companies that
specialize in assembling them are underwhelming in how accurate a picture of an
individual's preferences they assemble, see, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig, How to Find Out What
Big Data Knows About You, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115o41/what-big-data-does- and-doesnt-know-
about-me; Again, along the lines of any network effect, the combination of several sources
should be expected to exponentially increase the usefulness/intrusiveness of a profile.
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officials again,42 but the fact the FBI could identify presumably
innocent individuals as suspects so quickly is a clue that perhaps the
government has assembled a massive database of consumer
purchasing records by agglomerating a large number of similar
databases collected by companies. As with the phone records
database, expanding the databases expands the number of hits one
may generate for a narrow query (e.g. people who purchased peroxide
in X quantity within Y miles of Aurora, Colorado; people who are two
call steps removed from a terrorist's cell phone).
But the fact that three innocent Coloradans may have been briefly
flagged as of interest to a real terrorism investigation by dint of benign
consumer purchases is not the problem here-alarming as it may be to
average Americans who felt they had "nothing to fear" from NSA
activities. Nor are the potential flaws with the government's (or the
court's) interpretation of the scope of which records may be the
subject of a Section 215 order. While the government's reading of
Section 215 of the Patriot Act-one that the largely conservative judges
of the FISC have agreed with-is a broad one, and perhaps had a
distorting effect on annual reporting to Congress of the number of
times Section 215 had been used, the question of Congressional intent
is one on which reasonable people can disagree.43
The true legal problem underlying broad metadata collection
programs is that the government has long believed it doesn't need a
court order of any kind to grab information like these phone records,
42 Marcy Wheeler, Meet 3 PATRIOTAct False Positives Investigated for Buying Beauty
Supplies, EMPTYWHEEL BLOG (June 7, 2013),
http://www.emptywhee.net/213/o6/07/meet-3-patriot-act-false-positives-investigated-
for-buying-beauty-supplies/#sthash.77GHoOHW.dpuf.
43 See, e.g., Greg Nojeim, NSA Spying Under Section 215 of the PATRIOTAct: Illegal,
Overbroad, and Unnecessary, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY (June 19, 2013),
https://www.edt.org/files/pdfs/Analysis-Section-215-Patriot-Act.pdf; Orin Kerr, My
(Mostly Critical) Thoughts on the August 2013 FISC Opinion on Section 215, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sep. 17, 2013), http://www.volokh.Com/2o13/o9/17/thoughts-august-2013-
fise-opinion-section-215/; contra Steven G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs:
Bulk Acquisition of Telephone Metadata under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted
Collection under Section 702, LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (Sep. 1, 2013), available
at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2o13/o8/Bradbury-Vol-i-No-3.pdf.
In addition to the relatively detailed post-Snowden analysis offered by Judge Eagan of the
FISC in defense of the program, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-109
FISA Ct. (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fise/br13-
o -primary-order.pdf, two district courts have now reached opposing conclusions on the
legality of the phone records program in cases seeking injunctive relief brought by third-
party litigants: see Klayman v. Obama, 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013)
(unconstitutional), ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-CV-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (lawful).
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because the Fourth Amendment does not even apply to them under
what is known as the "third party doctrine." In Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979),44 the Supreme Court held that government does
not need a warrant to track the phone numbers you call because you
are handing those numbers over to the phone company to route your
call (and bill you for the service) every time you dial a number, and
once you voluntarily give any information to a third party, the
government is entitled to simply demand it from the third party as
readily as if it were a confession you had given to your neighbor.
So the Fourth Amendment and its warrant protections do not
apply to information like dialed phone numbers-that you turn over to
a third party for their use. The most frequent analogy used to justify
the distinction between the private contents of the phone conversation
(protected by the Fourth Amendment) and the numbers (not
protected) is the difference between the address written on the outside
of a letter and the contents of the envelope: the contents are protected,
the address is not.
Smith is widely criticized; 46 one reason most people have not heard
about it is that Congress re-regulated much of this area by statute
shortly afterwards, in response to the decision. 47 The Court said it was
"doubt[ful] that people in general entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial,, 48 perhaps because that was an era of
being billed per call, but at the time local numbers didn't show up on
most bills, a fact to which the Court has no answer beyond saying it
was "not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the fourth amendment 49 by
making its rule turn on the distinction between local and long-
44 The origins of the doctrine are usually traced to both Smith and United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976) (banking records).
45 We now know, coincidentally, that the Post Office is scanning the outside of all mail
envelopes in its system for the government. See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All
Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2o13/O7/O4/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html?_r=o
(describing the "Mail Isolation Control and Tracking" program, instituted after post-9/11
anthrax mail attacks).
46 Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 563 n.5 (2009)
("A list of every article or book that has criticized the doctrine would make this the world's
longest law review footnote." (then citing ten academic works criticizing the doctrine)).
47 See Electronic Communications PrivacyAct (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-5o8, 1oo Stat. 1848
(1986), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
48 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
49 Id. at 745.
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distance numbers. Commentators have also suggested the case should
simply be confined to its facts and understood as an implicit consent
case (something Marshall's dissent refutes by pointing out the illusory
nature of consent in the context of monopoly providers of telecom
services). In the modern era of unlimited (or volume) calling plans
one might readily questions whether the crazy-quilt is simply the
content/routing information distinction: why shouldn't the content of
the phone call also be considered something "voluntarily turned over
to the phone company[?]" And it is hard to square the notion that
people lack an expectation of privacy in their electronic
communications records nowadays, where the degree to which we live
our lives online would have been unimaginable in 1979.
The government, however, believes the upshot of Smith is that
vast categories of information we digital moderns usually assume will
be kept private can in fact be obtained by the government without
asking a court for approval. Instead, the government need only issue a
subpoena to your corporate provider. So not just phone records" (who
you called and who called you), but records of internet web sites you
visited,5 all your banking records52 and credit information, 53 records
held by your travel agents,54 older emails stored by your email
provider, and older stored texts,55 and drafts of emails, and files you
50 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (NSL statute regarding telecom subscriber and billing
records).
51 As to (numerical) IP addresses, see United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510-11 (9th
Cir. 20o8) ("Neither this nor any other circuit has spoken to the constitutionality of
computer surveillance techniques that reveal...the IP addresses of websites visited... .We
conclude that the surveillance techniques the government employed here are
constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the [Supreme] Court
approved in Smith."); Orin Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act:
The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U.L. Rev. 607, 644-648 (2003) (noting ambiguities in
statutory controls on URLs (non-numerical web addresses) and web search queries).
52 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2012) (NSL statute regarding records from financial
institutions).
53 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(u), 1681(v) (2012) (authorizing NSLs directed to consumer
credit reporting agencies).
54 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 436 (2012) (NSL statute regarding travel agencies, financial
institutions, and credit agencies).
55 See, e.g., Letter from AT&T Executive Vice President Timothy P. McKone to Sen. Edward
J. Markey at 5 (Oct. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-10-03 ATI? re Carrier.pdf (noting texts
will be turned over on mere subpoena).
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store on the cloud,56 all can be obtained without court order through
issuance of a subpoena to the corporate third party holding the
records or other material on behalf of you, the consumer. That is
shockingly broad list, including essentially all of your commercial
interactions with the outside world.
There are very limited restrictions in the case law on what the
government can subpoena,57 and Congress has passed statutes
authorizing broader subpoenas-National Security Letters are the
variant most widely known to the public-allowing various sorts of
business records to be demanded en masse without judicial
involvement, nor, typically, notice to the business' client whose
customer records are being sought.58
The lack of notice means the end user will typically not have an
opportunity to challenge the surveillance. What if the provider resists
the subpoena?59 In practice, we should expect that to nearly never
happen. The providers of most concern here are telecom companies.
And the telecom industry is so heavily regulated El and so beholden to
government on rate regulation, taxes, antitrust issues, wireless
bandwidth access 11 that it has every reason to cooperate with any
demand, no matter how legally outrageous. Its track record over the
last decade is proof in point: only Qwest offered any resistance to the
56 See Theodoric Meyer and Peter Maass, No Warrant, No Problem: How the Government
Can Get Your Digital Data, PROPUBLICA (July 31, 2013) (summarizing provisions of
ECPA), http://www.propublica.org/special/no-warrant -no-problem-how-the-government-
can -still-get-your-digital-data; Julian Sanchez, Can §215 Be Used for Content Collection?,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 13, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2o13/12/13/can-215-be-used-for-
content/.
57 See, e.g., Bradbury, supra note 35, at 5; Orin Kerr, Metadata, the NSA, and the Fourth
Amendment: A Constitutional Analysis of Collecting and Querying Call Records
Databases, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 17, 2013),
http://www.volokh.Com/2o13/o7/17/metadata-the-nsa- and-the-fourth- amendment- a-
constitutional- analysis -of-collecting-and-querying-call -records-databases/ (subpoena
must be "sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that
compliance will not be unnecessarily burdensome") (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 544 (1967)).
58 See supra notes 50, 52-54.
59 Kerr, Metadata, supra note 57 (characterizing Barnett's argument elsewhere), e.g., Brief
of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in Support of Petitioner at 17-18, 25, In re Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr., No. 13-58, (U.S. Aug. 12, 2013), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tsaccato institute-13-58.pdf
(arguing that both "Verizon and EPIC are being deprived of their property in secret
proceedings").
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NSA Program,s° there appears to have been no provider resistance to
the Section 215 phone records collection program, and the instances
of even internet companies (arising out of the famously libertarian
culture of Silicon Valley) fighting back against third party subpoena
requests are rare enough to make news when they happen.6 Only
several months into the Snowden stories-as worries about defection
of foreign customers to non-U.S. providers have mounted, particularly
in the cloud-storage industry-do we read frequently about outrage at
companies with an international consumer market such as Google and
Yahoo.62
So the debate over enhancing FISC review-in terms of general
transparency, adversary process (by appointing a sort of Devil's
Advocate to argue in camera for the public's or targets' interests), and
judicial selection reform and panel seating on that CoUrt, 63 should ring
a bit hollow: the government doesn't need to go to the FISC to collect
any of this metadata. It is sometimes easier to use Section 215 than
other authorities, and if the protean past of these programs is any
clue, in the future the government may shift towards using various
subpoena powers anyway.
60 See John O'Neil and Eric Lichtblau, Qwest's Refusal of N.SA. Query Is Explained, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2OO6), http://www.nytimes.Com/2oo6/o5/12/washington/12end-
phone.html. Yahoo also challenged the constitutionality of the 2007 Protect America Act,
itself a response to the end of the original NSA Program and the predecessor to the FAA,
before the FISC and its Court of Review. See Claire Cain Miller, Secret Court Ruling Put
Tech Companies in Data Bind, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2o13/o6/14/technology/secret-court-ruling-put-tech-
companies-in-data-bind.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o.
61 E.B. Boyd, Why Twitter Was the Only Company to Challenge the Secret Wikileaks
Subpoena, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.fasteompany.com/1716oo/why-
twitter-was-only-company-challenge-seeret-wikileaks-subpoenal; Ryan Singel, Twitter's
Response to WikiLeaks Subpoena Should Be the Industry Standard, WIRED (Jan. 10,
2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2o11/o1/twitter/. For an interesting third
perspective on corporate compliance, cf. Bruce Schneier, Snowden, the NSA, and Free
Software -Bruce Schneier + Eben Moglen (Dec. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pURimA&feature=youtu.be ("google was
surprised that it was penetrated given it was cooperating in ways it thought it had to,
legally").
62 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Sata
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-
google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/3o/e5d661e-4166-
11 e3-8b74-d89d7l4ca4dd story.html.
63 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed: Surveillance and the FISA court, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 24,
2013), http://articles.latimes.Com/2o13/sep/24/opinion/la-oe-ackerman-fisa-reform-
20130924.
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One stream of metadata by itself can reveal a lot about you.
Commentators have already exhaustively catalogued the obvious
examples: the records of your calls to your therapist, to a divorce
lawyer, to a drug rehab center, all can reveal things about you that you
might rather keep secret, and taken together the sum of your
communications metadata can form a picture of your inner life and
your political beliefs that few of us would want to share with the
government.64 Indeed, the broader, more readily-analyzable picture of
an individual created by mass metadata collection and analysis may be
more revealing to government than content surveillance, which is
inherently more cumbersome to analyze.6"
Ironically, one particularly corrosive aspect of metadata
surveillance that has been drowned out by the Snowden revelations
was the previous surveillance scandal of the year, the seizure of the
Associated Press' phone records. In an investigation of a leak at the
center of a story worked on by seven reporters, the Justice
Department authorized seizure of records from 20 lines in four offices
used by loo AP reporters.66 If the government can see that three
government officials spoke to a reporter the day before a story
revealing some embarrassing government secret is published, it will
64 For just a small sample of the commentary, see, e.g., Ethan Zuckerman, Me and my
Metadata (July 3, 2013) (citing various other studies and stories), available at
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2o13/o7/o3/me- and-my-metadata-thoughts-on-
online-surveillance/.
6 5 See, e.g., Vindication for Snowden? Obama Panel Backs Major Curbs on NSA
Surveillance, Phone Record Data Mining, DEMOCRACY Now! (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/2o13/12/19/vindication for snowden obama panel ba
cks (quoting Ben Wizner: "I hear from law enforcement and intelligence officials that they
prefer metadata, not just [for] how revealing it is in an individual case, but because they
can use their powerful analytic tools. They can mine metadata in a way that they really
can't content. People can disguise what they're talking about when they're having
conversations with each other, but metadata doesn't lie. Metadata says who contacted who,
when and for how long."); More Intrusive Than Eavesdropping? NSA Collection of
Metadata Hands Gov't Sweeping Personal Info, DEMOCRACY Now! (June 12, 2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/2o13/6/12/more intrusive than eavesdropping nsa co
llection (quoting Susan Landau: "metadata of a phone call tells what you do as opposed to
what you say"); Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(Nov. 21, 2013) (quoting former NSA General Counsel Stuart Baker: "Metadata absolutely
tells you everything about somebody's life... .If you have enough metadata you don't really
need content").
66 See Sari Horwitz, Under Sweeping Subpoenas, Justice Department Obtained AP Phone
Records in Leak Investigation, Wash. Post (May 13, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/under-sweeping-subpoenas-
justice-department-obtained-ap-phone-records-in-leak-
investigation/2o13/o5/13/1dibb82-bcii- iie2-89c9-3be8o95fe767_story.html.
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not be hard to piece together who the source is. For these most
sensitive communications-reporters with sources, attorneys with
clients [fear of such metadata surveillance will case a massive chilling
effect, just as surely as fear of the NSA Program's surveillance of the
content of communications cast a chill on the communications and
therefore on the litigation activity of the CCR and ACLU attorney-
plaintiffs in the 20o6 litigation.
Like this recent AP phone records seizure, past broad phone
records seizures directed at reporters have seemed punitive in scope.
Several years ago, John Solomon of AP was a target of a phone records
subpoena, after he published a story about the FBI's botched
investigation of corrupt New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli. Two
years later Solomon spoke to a number of former sources who told
him they stopped calling him because they knew he was a target. The
metadata seizures, in other words, had had a chilling effect on the
willingness of others to use the phone to talk to him-in much the
same way as various third parties were no longer willing to speak to
the attorney-plaintiffs and amici in the NSA program and FAA
litigation.68
One might conclude that reporters in this area really need to work
like Woodward and Bernstein in the parking garage, or like the drug
dealers in The Wire: constantly buying and disposing of burners
(cheap prepaid cell phones) to communicate. However, even that
strategy is at risk given the breadth of the Snowden metadata
revelations: it has been reported that one use of the massive phone
records databases has been to use calling patterns to identify
disposable phones with known targets by identifying their known
calling networks and working backwards.69
67 See Erik Wemple, AP subpoena: Journo says he lost sources in 2001 case, WASH. POST
(May 14, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-
wemple/wp/2o13/05/14/ap-subpoen//.
68 See, e.g., Affirmation of Rachel Meeropol at 17, Center for Constitutional Rights v.
Bush, No. 06-ev-313, (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2oo6), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCRNSA AffirmationRachelMeeropol-o6-o6.pdf; Brief of
Amici Curiae The Center for Constitutional Rights and Attorneys Involved in National
Security Litigation, Supporting Respondents, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, No. 11-1025
(Sep. 24, 2012) at 7, 9 (describing unwillingness of individuals to speak with or be
contacted by attorney Tina Foster); Id. at 12 (communications with attorney Ramzi Kassem
lost due to other party's fear of surveillance).
69 See Bruce Schneier, Fingerprinting Burner Phones, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Oct. 14,
2013), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2o13/lo/fingerprinting-5.html (citing
NSA document).
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Having several streams of data (not just calling records) can reveal
a lot more: studies have shown that analyzing your friendship group
can reliably predict whether you are gay or not.7" A less-scientific
analysis of social club memberships of 254 prominent Massachusetts
colonials produced Paul Revere as the most centrally-networked
figure of the bunch.71 And it turns out the NSA is getting a lot of
different streams of data and attempting to assemble full "social
graphs" (a term probably mostly familiar from Facebook's search-
your-friends feature called Graph Search) for targets. But they are also
doing it directly: in October it was reported that the NSA is collecting
millions of contact lists from email accounts-essentially, grabbing
ready-made social network maps.72
One unknown area is the extent that the NSA is gathering mobile
phone location data.73 Does it fall in the same third-party category as
the other records above?74 The issue is not yet resolved in the courts.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court is clearly sensitive to the notion that
government tracking of the movement of citizens may implicate
Fourth Amendment interest. In United States v. Jones, a case
invalidating evidence derived from a GPS tracker physically installed
on a suspect's car (and operated in excess of the narrow geographical
and temporal scope allowed by warrant), the Court's opinion held
Justice Alito's concurrence noted that "longer term GPS monitoring"
70 See Zuckerman, Me and my Metadata, supra note 64.
71 See Kieran Healy, Using Metadata to Find Paul Revere (June 9, 2013),
http://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/o6/og9/using-metadata-to find-paul-revere/.
72 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Addresses
Globally, WASH. POST. (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.om/world/national-
security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/1o/14/8e58b5be-
34f9-le3-8oc6-7e6dd8d22d8f story.html.
73 See Patrick C. Toomey, It Sure Sounds Like the NSA Is Tracking Our Locations, ACLU
BLOG (Sep. 30, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-
liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location (noting evasiveness of NSA official'
public statements on question).
74 The courts to decide the issue thus far have generally said "yes": See In re United States
for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 8o9 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("While cell-phone users do not technically convey their location, they do
voluntarily convey their cell-phone signal to the cell towers, and expose that information to
cell-phone service provider's equipment in the ordinary course of business... .[However,]
the court concludes an exception to the third-party-disclosure doctrine should be applied
to cumulative cell-site-location records."); United States v. Skinner, 69o F.3d 772, 773 (6th
Cir. 2012) (GPS phone data not protected by Fourth Amendment); In re Application of the
United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 6oo (5th Cir. July 30, 2013)
(same).
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implicated expectations of privacy, and Justice Sotomayor's
concurrence stated more broadly:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider
the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. .. .This approach is ill suited
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose
the phone numbers that they dial or text to their
cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-
mail addresses with which they correspond to their
Internet service providers; and the books, groceries,
and medications they purchase to online retailers.
Perhaps ... some people may find the "tradeoff" of
privacy for convenience "worthwhile," or come to
accept this "diminution of privacy" as "inevitable"...
and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would
accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to
the Government of a list of every Web site they had
visited in the last week, or month, or year. But
whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.75
This may be the rare area that is promising for privacy advocates
to bring before the court, as a number of recent Fourth Amendment
cases have broken along unpredictable voting lines at the Court-
neither democrat-republican nor the other usual variant, pragmatist
(Breyer, Roberts) versus formalists (Scalia, Ginsburg).7 ' As this piece
goes to press, Judge Leon's decision in the first-filed Section 215
phone records challenge77 reached the issue of whether the third-party
75 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
76 See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1 (2012) (Kennedy, Roberts, Thomas, Breyer, Alito,
JJ. in majority; Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, JJ.).
77 Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-o881, 2013 WL 6571596, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
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doctrine applies to remove any Fourth Amendment protection in call
databases and decided it against the government, setting up a possible
resolution by the Supreme Court should the circuits split the way the
two district courts to address the issues have.78
B. Content Surveillance
I have very little to say about the details of the NSA's
contemporary content surveillance programs, in part because they
seem to be largely continuous with the NSA Program surveillance that
we challenged in 2oo6, and that was intended to be effectively
codified by the 20o8 FAA statute that the government has said is the
source of legal authority for the PRISM surveillance program.79
PRISM was the subject of the second major Snowden-sourced story to
appear, and was perhaps received with the most outrage because it
showed how closely the telecoms and internet companies were
cooperating with the NSA.
General Alexander has succinctly characterized these programs by
stating that NSA's goal is to collect everything.8" With PRISM it is
collected from the servers of just about every consumer IT company
one can think of: Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, YouTube, and
others. Even Skype, which used 256 bit encryption to transmit video
calls over the internet, was a party-as a consumer, the encryption
ensured that your video call was safe even in international transit, but
the company that you were trusting to encrypt it might well have been
handing over your content data to the government under the FAA.
As for communications in transit, NSA programs such as
BLARNEY intercept almost everything as it passes from major hub to
major hub on the internet's backbone fiberoptic cables. This is exactly
the sort of interception that Mark Klein reported was happening
within AT&T switching stations in 2oo6. (Amazingly, this internet
78 Cf ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-cv-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (finding phone records
collection constitutional, relying on Smith).
79 See Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (June 8, 2013),
http://www.dni .gov/files/documents/Facts%200n%2othe%2oCollection%200f%2olntelli
gence%2oPursuant%2oto%2oSection%20702.pdf.
80 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, For NSA Chief, Terrorist Threat Drives Passion to
'collect it all,' Observers Say, WASH. POST (July 14, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-nsa-chief-terrorist -threat-
drives-passion-to-collect-it- all/2013/07/14/3d26ef8 o-ea49- 1e2- a3ol-
ea5a816d211 story.html.
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traffic can all be searched in real time by NSA analysts using NSA's
XKeyscore data retrieval system.)
Because corporate providers typically store large troves of
metadata (and have commercial incentives to hold on to it for some
time and analyze it in some detail), the question of whether it is
feasible for the government to seize and store the same is rarely asked.
But when stories claim that massive content interception and storage
is taking place, the public's first reactions always is: is that even
technologically feasible? While the answer was uncertain to our
technology experts in 2oo6, the answer today is clearly yes. In their
2011 book Cypherpunks, Julian Assange and Jacob Appelbaum
conclude that it would cost around C30 million to store all phone
content in and out of Germany for a year.8 Even quadrupling that to
adjust for the greater U.S. population is trivial in comparison to the
NSA's $12 billion budget. (When East Germany still existed and was
trying to achieve this level of surveillance, 100,000 members of the 16
million person population worked for the Stasi, which needed 10,000
staffers simply to transcribe wiretaps. Now an array of iPhones could
accomplish the same task.) The cost may be even less now, in 2013:
Brewster Kahle estimates it would take under 300 Petabytes (300,000
Terabytes) to hold all U.S. traffic for a year, and that the hardware
required to store all that would cost about $20 million. For years
there have been stories that the NSA is building a massive storage
center in Utah capable of holding 12,000 Petabytes of data." As long
as NSA can keep the power running to it (allegedly at a cost of $20
million a year),8 they have more than the capacity they need. So when
81 JULIAN ASSANGE, JACOB APPELBAUM, ANDY Mi LLER-MAGUHN, AND JEREMIE
ZIMMERMANN, CYPHERPUNKS 38, 168 (2012).
82 See Lily Hay Newman, The NSA Can Afford To Store Data From Years Of Phone Calls,
GIZMODO (June 16, 2013), http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-can-afford-to-store-data-from-
years -of-phone-ca-513693317 (citing Kahle's spreadsheet available at
https://does.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=oAuqlWHQKooOdGJrSzhBVnhoWGzWH
pCZFNVcURkXoE#gid=o).
83 Kashmir Hill, Blueprints Of NSA's Ridiculously Expensive Data Center In Utah Suggest
It Holds Less Info Than Thought, FORBES (July 24, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/24/blueprints-of-nsa-data-center-in-
utah-suggest-its-storage-capacity-is-less-impressive-than-thought/.
84 Kashmir Hill, The NSA 's Hugely Expensive Utah Data Center Has Major Electrical
Problems And Basically Isn't Working, FORBES (July 24, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/10/07/the-nsas-hugely-expensive-utah-
data-center-has-major-electrical-problems-and-basically-isnt-working/; Howard Berkes,
Booting Up: New NSA Data Farm Takes Root In Utah, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
(Sep. 23, 2013),
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an FBI agent on CNN claims the government will be able to go back
and listen to calls Tamerlane Tsarnaev made to his wife before the
Boston bombing, the claim may be realistic. 5
The main point to remember about these massive content
dragnets is that this is precisely how civil libertarians were saying the
2oo8 surveillance amendments that Senator Obama signed off on a
few months before the election would be implemented when the FAA
passed. The ACLU filed Clapper an hour after President Bush signed
the FAA, arguing that it had almost no practical limitations. The FAA
allows content surveillance not based on any individual suspicion
presented to the FISC. Instead, the court approves criteria for a whole
program of surveillance, and reviews it only to check that the criteria
is intended to sweep in communications of people located outside the
US. There seems to be next to no after-the-fact review provided for,
although cases of the NSA misrepresenting the scope of collection
practices seem to have been common based on several FISC opinions
declassified (with the intent to reduce public criticism of that court's
secretive process) in the wake of the Snowden revelations.
C. Implications of long-term storage
One obvious concern for civil liberties in an era where mass
surveillance data can be stored for long periods of time is that no one
knows who will be president in four years. Nor do we know what
political or religious associations may become suspect in the future-
the communist ties or Muslim community associations of some future
generation. (Again, it is as realistic to think NSA could store all the
data it gathers for very long periods as it is to think they could gather
it in the first place.) 6
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltecheonsidered/2o13/o9/23/225381596/booting-up-new-
nsa-data-farm-takes-root-in-utah ($20 million annual operational cost).
85 See generally John Villasenor, RECORDING EVERYTHING: DIGITAL STORAGE AS AN
ENABLER OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS (Dec. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.brooldngs.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/14%2odigital %2ostor
age%2ovilllasenor/1214_digital storage villasenor.pdf (storing 5-minute interval location
data for 50 million people for a year would cost less than $3000; phone call audio content
storable for 17 cents per person in 2011, two cents per person by 2015).
86 See Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Surveillance Program Reaches 'into the
past' to Retrieve, Replay Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-
reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9g 1e3-
a49e-76adc92of19_story.html (indicating NSA stores all voice calls of one particular
target foreign nation over preceding 3o days).
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The history of warrantless broad-brush surveillance is extensively
documented." I will simply note a few points here: both republican
and democratic presidents collected massive amounts of data on their
political opponents in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War
movements. If it scares us to think that the FBI had dossiers on civil
rights leaders and antiwar protesters in the 5os and 6os, today a far
less transparent agency has dossiers on literally everyone. (Ironically,
James Comey's FBI directorship is term-limited to ten years because
Congress was concerned to never allow the emergence of another J.
Edgar Hoover, with dossiers on elected officials." Yet the NSA is using
Congressional statutes to collect such information, potentially, on
everyone.) Indeed, the new suit that the EFF has filed in federal court
in California is centered on this idea: that mass-collection programs
are a threat to associational freedom in the same way that Alabama's
attempts to obtain the NAACP's membership lists were held to be in
NAACP v. Alabama.89
III. PROTECTIONS (AND THEIR FAILINGS)
So that's what's happening factually. Even in simplified form it can
be confusing and overwhelming, and that does mute the voting
public's response. But we shouldn't extrapolate from that, that the
public doesn't care (and, from that, that Congress will never care
either). Public polling data is highly consistent on this front, and it has
been since just after 9/11 to the present day: when the American
public believes that surveillance is targeted at terrorists or targeted at
foreigners, it does not mind that it is happening on a larger-than-
expected scale. But the moment the public believes that surveillance-
even not-very-deep surveillance like the non-content programs
discussed above-has a chance to touch on their communications, a
strong reaction follows. So the public's reaction to these programs is
8 7 See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 16 (Apr. 26, 1976) ("Duplication,
waste, inertia and ineffectiveness in the intelligence community has been one of the costs
of insulating the intelligence bureaucracy from the rigors of Congressional and public
scrutiny."); Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. at 6-11, 14-15, Center for
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. o6-ev-313 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2oo6), (describing
evidence of surveillance targeting anti-war and civil rights activists), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCRNSA NAACPetalbriefBrennanCenter04-o6.pdf.
88 See Mark Silva, FBI's Comey: 'Tethered' to Fidelity, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://go.bloomberg.com/political capital/2013 10- 28/fbis-comey-tethered-to- fidelity/.
8 See First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/cases/first-unitarian-church-los-angeles-v-nsa.
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actually nuanced and stronger at times than many seasoned observers
would anticipate.
Perhaps the best example of this in practice is the reaction to John
Poindexter's Total Information Awareness (TIA) program-which
aspired to conduct mass surveillance from various data streams and
filter that mound of big data in revealing ways. When its existence
came to light in 2003, the public was horrified.9" (Though surely
choosing a disgraced Iran-Contra figure as the program's leader didn't
help, the fact that the program itself touched the communications of
many ordinary Americans seemed to provoke most of the revulsion.)
Congress felt the pressure from the voting public enough to (at least
gesturally)9I pull the funding for the program shortly after it became
publicized.
Of course, for people like journalists and attorneys whose
communications are especially vulnerable, all the serious chilling
effects noted in Clapper and the 2oo6 lawsuits continue to exist in
light of both the content and metadata programs that we know
continue (albeit under occasionally varying legal authority) today.
Surely these chilling effects exist with members of the general public
as well: just ask any recent college graduate whether they limit what
they post on social media out of fear of what some future employer
may find there, and extrapolate that to political associations that some
future government may find criminally suspect-Palestinian activists,
radical environmentalists, etc.
What, then, are the safeguards that concerned members of the
public might look to? And do they really offer any comfort?
90 See, e.g., William Safire, YouAre a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,2002),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2002/ 11/14/opinion/you- are- a-suspect.html (characterizing
and criticizing program); Press Release, ACLU, Congress Dismantles Total Information
Awareness Spy Program; ACLU Applauds Victory, Calls for Continued Vigilance Against
Snoop Programs (Sep. 25, 2003), available at https://www.aclu.org/national-
security/congress-dismantles-total-information-awareness-spy-program-aclu-applauds-
victory- [hereinafter ACLU Press Release] (quoting ACLU Legislative Counsel Timothy
Edgar: 'This was a hugely unpopular program with a mission far outside what most
Americans would consider acceptable in our democracy").
91 See ACLU Press Release, supra note 89; Pentagon's 'Terror Information Awareness'
program will end, USA TODAY (Sep. 25, 2003),
http://usatoday3o.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-09-25-pentagon-officex.htm
(Congress "shifted some of the high-powered software under development to different
government offices, to be used to gather intelligence from U.S. citizens abroad and
foreigners").
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A. Judicial Review
On the metadata front, commentary has focused on the failings of
the FISC (especially after, later in the summer, a pretty poor opinion
was released justifying the call records program written by a judge
renewing the 215 order that was published in the Guardian). But
again, the most important point to note is that the government
believes, because of the third party doctrine, it does not even need
court orders if it chooses to gather this material with subpoenas (and
NSLs are really just a Congressionally-created type of very broad
subpoena). When the government next shifts legal theories for its
metadata collection, it will not matter what Congress' precise intent
with Section 215 was.
It's also clear the FISC does not often get the information it needs.
A number of its decisions were released in unclassified form after
Snowden; previously there had not been any from the FISC itself,
though a few opinions of its appellate court had been released. One
2oo9 decision said the government had "repeatedly submitted
inaccurate descriptions" of the program the FISC was reviewing; two
years later, a 2011 opinion noted the government had disclosed a
"third instance in less than three years... [of] a substantial
misrepresentation concerning the scope of a major collection
program." But each time the NSA tinkered with its internal controls
and procedures, and was allowed to keep going by the Court. 92
Of course the way the court hears matters-ex parte, like any court
hearing warrant applications-is not conducive to rejecting many
applications, and the composition of the court (with judges selected by
Chief Justice Roberts, all but one of whom were appointed by
republican presidents) and the government is able to choose the first
judge it approaches whenever a new form of surveillance is proposed
(presumably a factor in the January 2007 order(s) that were quickly
reversed on renewal review by other FISC judges), one would not
expect it to produce much.93 But my own impression is that many
reform proposals circulating currently are merely "tinkering with the
machinery of mass surveillance" (to paraphrase Harry Blackmun);94
92 It is unclear whether FISC ever performed a comprehensive analysis of Section 215 and
its application to the phone records program until after the Snowden disclosures became
public. See, e.g., Marcy Wheeler, By "Secret Law"Did They Mean 'Not Written Down"?,
EMPTYWHEEL BLOG (Sep. 18, 2013).
93 See Benkler, How the NSA and FBI Foil Weak Oversight, supra note 29. Judge Mary A.
McLaughlin was appointed by President Clinton; all other current FISC judges were named
by Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush or George W. Bush.
94 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackman, J., dissenting).
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the overbroad scope of the FAA statute95 and the statutes governing
third-party records requests (NSLs, Section 215 orders, and their like)
is the true problem, and one that would go unaddressed even if the
public had an in camera advocate, the judges sat in banks of three,
were not hand-picked by the Chief Justice, and the court enjoyed
more transparency than exists now. Moreover, most metadata
collection lies entirely outside of FISC review-for example, the email
address-book collection program revealed in mid-October occurs
outside the U.S. and so is only subject to the NSA's internal "checks
and balances."96
Finally, the traditional model of judicial review loses all meaning
when it's applied to mass surveillance programs. If extending the
physical search warrant to wiretapping posed the difficult conceptual
problems presaged in Berger, the Title III individualized-suspicion
model of judicial review seems completely incompatible with mass
surveillance. Particularity is at the center of judicial review of warrant
applications; there is no equivalent when a court is asked to review a
proposed program of surveillance, a set of criteria for targeting. It's a
bit like applying strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring test to the
(inherently broad) compelling interest of diversity. The ACLU was
correct to portray the FISC's review of FAA applications as absurdly
shallow in Clapper, especially in light of the apparent absence of any
strong judicial oversight of the minimization procedures meant to
ensure that domestic conversations (and, as we wrongly assumed,
infra part C, privileged conversations) were in fact being filtered out
notwithstanding that they might have met the broad criteria for
information gathering under the proposed programs. This has led
many commentators to assume that any review of such broad
programs will turn on the first half of the Fourth Amendment-on
"reasonableness," standing alone-ignoring the second half (the
particularity requirement for issuance of warrants, which the modern
court has generally grafted onto the first half in holding warrantless
searches per se unreasonable).
95 Interestingly, in denying standing in Clapper, the Court assumed the robustness of FISC
review. The Court cited five factors that ought to have given the plaintiffs some comfort,
most notably of which was the fact that, under the statute, the FISC was supposed to review
FAA content-collection applications to ensure compliance with the 4th Amendment. So the
weakness of FISA Court review would seem to make the chilling effect felt by plaintiffs
there more reasonable.
96 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA collects millions of e-mail address books
globally, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013) http://wwv.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail address-books-globally/2013/1r/14/8e58b5be-
34f9-1 e3-8oc6-7e6dd8d22d8f story.html.14.
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B. Congressional oversight
The well-catalogued duplicity of NSA officials has certainly
contributed something to Congress' failure to limit the agency's
activities over the years. Put to one side glaring examples such as DNI
James Clapper's response to Senator Wyden's question "Does the NSA
collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of
Americans?"-"Not wittingly"-which Clapper later characterized as
the "least untruthful" answer he could in open session.97
But an underreported aspect of the problem is the fact that by
constantly shifting the legal authority used to conduct substantively-
consistent mass content and metadata surveillance, the agency
presents an always-shifting target for Congressional oversight. So by
the time a hidden OLC opinion comes to light, the mass content
surveillance is being conducted under a FISC order. Hearings about
one form of NSL usage bog down in details and repeated, time-
consuming requests for better data; by the next year, the same records
may be being gathered via a 215 order.
The high classification levels of these programs (and
Congressional deference to such designations) have also negatively
impacted oversight. The NSA Program was, notoriously, described in
top secret briefings to the members of the intelligence committees,
including many democrats. But they were not allowed to bring their
legal staffers into those briefings due to classification/need-to-know
concerns asserted by the administration. Jay Rockefeller went as far
as to protect this in a (classified) letter (that itself was allowed to be
released only after the program was disclosed by the Times) to the
administration, noting that without his staffers he was unable to make
sense of what he was briefed on, and presumably whether it was legal
in light of Congress' 1978 FISA statute or not. Of course, once the
programs were revealed, the administration defended itself against a
central criticism-that it had never so much as asked for modification
of the FISA statute-by noting that key democrats in Congress were
97 Of course, Wyden had let him know the questions in advance, so the idea that Clapper
had to lie on his feet to protect classified information defies credulity; his own defense, in
fact, was that "collect" means something technical to a surveillance junkie like himself, and
so he was simply confused by what otherwise seemed like a straightforward question. See
Press Release, Office of Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Statement Responding to Director
Clapper's Statements About Collection on Americans (June 11, 2013), available at
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-statement-responding-to-
director-clappers-statements- about-collection-on- americans; Oliver Knox, Intelligence
chief Clapper: I gave 'least untruthful' answer on U.S. spying, YAHOO NEWS (June 10,
2013, 12:47 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/intel-chief-clapper-gave-least-
untruthful-answer-u- 164742798.html.
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aware of the Program and raised no objection; Rockefeller's rather
practical objection was easily overlooked by the public, and the
classified briefing seemed in retrospect to be a clever way to
preemptively tar natural opponents of the Program by association.
Finally, as noted previously, the fact that the leader of the
Democratic party switched positions on the FAA statute in the
summer of 20o8 has meant that there is no partisan incentive to make
surveillance an issue-instead, libertarian factions in both parties are
pushing against their own members (Ron Wyden versus Diane
Feinstein, Rand Paul versus Mike Rogers), in sharp contrast to the
partisan and libertarian furor over the NSA Program in 20o6.
Nonetheless, the closeness of recent votes in the House-likely a
consequence of the polling patterns described above-indicates that
Congress is not a lost cause notwithstanding all of these negatives.
C. Minimization
The Supreme Court's extension of Fourth Amendment protection
to the content of phone calls is a relatively modern thing. Prior to
1967, precedent held that if the government did not trespass onto your
property in installing the bug there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. The 1967 Katz decision changed this, holding that the
content of a call was protected because individuals had a reasonable
"expectation of privacy" in it (to use the formulation of Justice
Harlan's famous concurrence). 98
Congress responded to Katz by creating a statute to create ground
rules whereby courts could issue warrants for wiretaps, but one basic
problem was that, being a somewhat novel creature, the shape of what
a Fourth-Amendment complaint warrant should look like was unclear.
Whereas a traditional search warrant named the particular place to be
searched and the specific items to be seized, a wiretap usually named a
phone line to be bugged. And bugging a line is inherently a lot more
open-ended and intrusive than searching a place for evidence related
to a crime. Multiple people besides the target may use a line, the target
may speak about private things unrelated to the crime under
investigation, and in fact may even speak about privileged matters-
conversations with his attorney being a prime example. And of course
the tap is in place 24/7, and usually results in recording.
98 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
Ireasonable."').
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In a case called Berger v New York, s" decided a few months before
Katz, the Court specifically mentioned most of these problems and
suggested that any warrant for wiretapping would need to meet higher
standards, to be a super-warrant of sorts: wiretaps, being inherently
intrusive, might only be justifiable at all in investigations of serious
crimes. And they would require a variety of safeguards to ensure they
were as narrow in concept as the physical search warrants the
Founders envisioned: they would need to include time limits, the
application should establish why no other method of evidence
gathering would work, and, most importantly here, the application
would need to provide for "minimization"-meaning, there would need
to be procedures proposed for implementing the warrant that would
protect against intercepting and recording things outside the scope of
the warrant-irrelevant conversations-which would obviously include
privileged conversations, like those of the target with his attorney.'
Minimization was a key to CCR's claims of standing for its legal
staff plaintiffs in our 20o6 litigation. The government argued that
FISA surveillance would have been secret but just as harmful to us as
surveillance under the NSA Program; our response was that even if
the government could have convinced a judge to give it a warrant
against the people we were communicating with abroad, there would
have to be minimization procedures implemented that would protect
our work-product or attorney-client privileged communications.'
Despite the over 300 pages of briefing in the case, the government
never responded to this argument.
99 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57-6o, 63-64 (1967) (first suggesting such a
constitutional requirement to minimize scope of wire intercepts). The government has
conceded before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that courts have
constitutionalized the minimization requirement. See Supplemental Brief of the United
States, Appendix A: Comparison of FISA and Title III, In re Sealed Case, No. 02-001 (FISA
Ct. Rev. filed Sep. 25, 2002) at n.1.
100 Courts have interpreted minimization requirements to include, at a minimum, a duty to
institute procedures to protect the confidentiality of privileged communications. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1976) (approving minimization limited
to attorney-client and priest-penitent calls); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 157 (9th
Cir. 1975) (approving minimization, even in light of broad scope of monitoring, where
privileged calls were excluded); Kilgore v. Mitchell, 623 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 198o)
(noting that even prior to Scott, DOJ Title III policy mandated minimization of privileged
calls); United States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1974) (minimization requirement
met where officers instructed not to-and did not-monitor, record or spot-check privileged
conversations).
101 Note that attorneys are protected by various legal communications privileges, but
journalists are not. We had only attorney plaintiffs in our suits; the ACLU's similar suit
included journalists. Consequently, the briefs (and thus the judicial rulings) in their case
emphasized the minimization point somewhat less than our briefs did.
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Now we may know why: a DOJ memo published by the
Guardian0 2 indicates that the government's legal position seems to be
that for foreign intelligence wiretaps, it only needs to minimize
attorney-client conversations when the client is actually under
indictment. So talking to family or fact or expert witnesses or co-
counsel in, say, a Guantanamo habeas case, or in a pre-indictment
counseling for someone located abroad like Julian Assange-these
attorney communications, despite being clearly within the work-
product or attorney-client privileges respectively, would not be subject
to minimization. Indeed, there seems to be no reason this policy
would prevent interception of conversations taking place during calls
and in-person meetings with foreign-national clients detained at
Guantfnamo (which is, famously, technically outside the United
States). Rereading the various bits of evidence indicating that the NSA
Program involved surveillance of attorneys in light of this narrow
interpretation of legal privilege minimization simply amplifies our
initial concerns. In sum, the likelihood is that the executive branch's
implementation of minimization procedures provides far less
protection for the most sensitive sorts of communications-attorneys
with clients and other litigation participants-than we had previously
believed was the case. And that in turn will continue to make it harder
for litigators like us, working on national security cases of
international scope, to sue over other illegal behavior of the executive
branch.
Finally, it is worth noting that since the advent of Title III, the
actual minimization procedures used by the FBI and other agencies
have always been classified. This provides yet another avenue for the
intelligence agencies to hide behind slippery, shape-shifting legal
rationales: the idea that hidden minimization provisions exist and
limit the application of a leaked surveillance order allows for a ready
public-relations escape valve for the government anytime part of a
legal rationale for surveillance comes to light, for the government can
always claim that some hidden minimization procedures are at work
narrowing how often a human agent views records. Indeed, David Kris
speculated that the January 2007 orders that allowed the Bush
102 See Glenn Greenwald and James Ball, The Top Secret Rules that Allow NSA to Use US
data Without a Warrant, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2013), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/j un/2o/fisa-court-nsa-'without -warrant; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
OF 1978, AS AMENDED (Oct. 31, 2011), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/minimization-procedures-used by nsa in connecfio
n with fisa sect 702.pdf (declassified version, officially released Aug. 21, 2013).
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administration to continue the initial NSA Program under FISC
authorization were made possible only by strict minimization criteria
implemented by the court (but, like the orders themselves, entirely
unseen by the public)." 3 The paired Section 215 orders are an example
of how a second order may contain provisions minimizing the impact
of the first, broad collection order allowing compilation of the phone
records database; the odd fact that the one first published by the
Guardian contained no indication that the second order existed or
limited its application will surely generate a certain amount of
uncertainty about whether some as-yet-unseen minimization
procedures mitigate in practice the impact of future leaked
surveillance orders.
D. The intelligence/law-enforcement wall
Proponents of untrammeled intelligence gathering by outward-
directed foreign intelligence agencies like NSA have often claimed that
one major protection our system offers targets is the "wall" built
between intelligence gathering surveillance operations and
surveillance carried out in support of criminal investigations. Putting
to one side the complex question of what the nature of this separation
is in the post-9/11 era, this claim boils down to the idea that that
information gathered by these broadest NSA programs may never be
used in court against the targets.
I would offer two responses: First, lawyers have an absolute
obligation to protect client confidentiality, not just protect against the
use of their communications in court against a client. As the various
expert affidavits in our case and the ACLU chilling-effect cases
indicated, we are obliged to protect confidentiality regardless of
whether the confidence is ever used against the client in any forum:
"The decision [to refrain from use of vulnerable forms of electronic
communication] is not discretionary. It is obligatory.... It is no answer
to say that suppression is available as a remedy for any improperly
intercepted communication. Intercepted communications may be
exploited to the disadvantage of clients with no one the wiser .... It is
103 Robert Chesney, Can You Understand These Data Collection Stories Without
Understanding the Minimization Procedures?, LAWFARE BLOG (June 6, 2013),
http://www.1awfareblog.com/2o13/o6/minimization-procedures-data-collection/
(quoting David Kris, A Guide to the New FISA Bill, Part II, BALKINIZATION (June 22,
2oo8), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2oo8/o6/guide-to-new-fisa-bill-part-
ii.html).
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disclosure itself that is the evil against which lawyers must protect
clients, regardless of any additional consequences of the disclosure."'0 4
Second, the fact that intelligence is liable to be shared
internationally raises separate concerns. To use an example from out
20o6 case briefs: imagine we lawyers speak to family members of a
Guantanamo detainee in Egypt. His family states that he is
categorically opposed to violence, and was merely a political opponent
of the Mubarak regime. The U.S. intercepts and relays that
information to Mubarak's government. The consequences would be
dire, despite the fact that nothing discussed involves anything we
would characterize as criminal behavior (at least in a malum in se
sense). Clients and witnesses sensitive about either concern may
simply not wish to participate in litigation, and cease communicating
with us. °5
E. Foreign government resistance as a check on U.S. spying
Many of the most spectacular Snowden stories have involved
accounts of NSA surveillance cracking into the email accounts of UN
officials or foreign leaders like Felipe Calder6n, or tapping into Angela
Merkel's beloved and ever-present mobile handset.' 6 To the extent
people believe a lack of European cooperation with American
surveillance will result, I suspect that is unlikely to happen for several
reasons: first, many of these countries' executives may be happy to
have the NSA share with them intelligence that they are restricted
from gathering under their own laws. The likely outlet for the
frustration over the Merkel scandal will likely be negotiation of some
104 Affirmation of Professor Stephen Gillers, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, Docket
58, No. o6-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2oo6) at 5, paras. 9-1o.
105 For examples of related concerns, see, e.g., Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, What is
the NSA sharing with other countries?, AL JAZEERAAMERICA (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/i/what-is-the-nsa-
sharingwithothercountrieso.html.
106 See, e.g., James Ball and Nick Hopkins, GCHQ and NSA Targeted Charities, Germans,
Israeli PM and EU Chief, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/deC/2o/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-
government-eu-commissioner; Jens Glising, Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger
Stark, Fresh Leak on US Spying: NSA Accessed Mexican President's Email, DER SPIEGEL
(Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-
mexican-president-a-928817.html; Kevin Rawlinson, NSA Surveillance: Merkel's Phone
May Have Been Monitored for over lo years', THE OBSERVER (Oct. 26, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/26/nsa-surveillance-brazil-germany-un-
resolution.
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sort of bilateral no-spying-on-each-others-leaders arrangement 10 7
rather than a general effort to make it harder for NSA to spy within
their countries generally. In addition, much of the infrastructure of
global wired communications has been set up over the years such that
major network pipelines transit the U.S., the geographical straightest-
line-route rarely being a consideration when data flies at the speed of
light. So, for instance, most communications from the Middle East to
Asia move through U.S. based switches. 108 Even if political will existed
across the globe to resist NSA surveillance, the hardwiring of the
system would take time to rework. And for mobile communications,
which travel wirelessly over radio frequencies, resistance is nearly
futile; U.S. spy stations in England can pick up signals from cell
phones all throughout the continent.10 9
F. Ineffectiveness: A natural check?
President Obama has proclaimed himself eager to debate the
"balance of liberty and security" implicated by these surveillance
programs. Of course, the very terms of that debate presume that there
is always a tradeoff involved-that safeguards, typically coming in the
form of judicial review, always will operate to diminish security."I0 The
public tends to think of courts as primarily serving to throw a monkey
wrench into the gears of law enforcement's efforts to gather evidence,
as yet another mechanism whereby one branch slows down the work
of another.
Even putting aside all practical experience, it is odd to believe this
in theory. When we require the executive to show up in court and
107 But see, Howard LaFranchi, US Spying scandal: Why Germany and France Won't Get
Britain's Deal, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.esmonitor.com/World/Security- Watch/2013/1028/US-spying-scandal- Why-
Germany-and-France-won-t-get-Britain-s-deal-video (on the likelihood of such an
arrangement with Germany or other non-historical intelligence allies); Ashley Deeks, The
German Intelligence Agencies Are Coming To Town, LAWFARE BLOG,
http://www.lawfareblog.COm/2013/io/the-german-intelligence-agencies-are-coming-to-
town/.
108 JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR 51 (2006).
109 See generally BBC, Q&A: What You Need to Know About Echelon (May 29, 2001),
http://news.bbe.co.uk/2/hi/sience/nature/1357513.stm; on Echelon generally, see
PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, CHATTER 168 (2005).
110 But Cf. Bruce Schneier, How the NSA Threatens National Security, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
6, 2014), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2o14/o1/how-the-
nsa-threatens-national-security/282822/.
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prove with some small quantum of evidence that there is reason to
suspect the target of being worthy of surveillance, judicial oversight
isn't a burden to the system-instead, it results in more efficient law
enforcement because it focuses law enforcement's efforts on threats
that are real."' For 200-plus years having judges review the evidence
for "probable cause" before issuing search warrants is a system that
has worked to ensure not only that the innocent don't get searched,
but also that law enforcement doesn't waste its time with irrational
profiling.
Our historical experience with warrantless surveillance confirms
this. Inefficiency has been a hallmark of warrantless surveillance since
the Church Committee reports, which showed that Presidents Nixon
and Johnson targeted their political opponents (in the civil rights and
Vietnam War protest movements)."' "Duplication, waste, and inertia"
were the conclusions of one part of the Committee's reports on what
happened when the agencies were allowed to gather information
without any effective outside oversight."3 Whenever we removed
courts as agents of accountability and oversight, we got lazy law
enforcement.
Mass surveillance of the scope described in the Snowden
documents should present other problems in theory as well. General
Alexander's claim that the NSA seeks to "collect everything" implicitly
assumes that size of the data pool gathered equals success. But
intelligence experts themselves have long warned of the danger that
the more data you collect, the more chaff there is hiding the kernels of
wheat, the more haystack hiding the needle." 4 (Alexander's response
to this before Congress was: "You need the haystack to find the
needle," which perhaps only proves that the actual meaning of farm
metaphors is lost on high-tech executives.)
111 But Cf. Snowden: "When your working process every morning starts with poking around
a haystack of seven billion innocent lives, you're going to miss things... .We're blinding
people with data we don't need." Julia Angwin, NSA Struggles to Make Sense of Flood of
Surveillance Data, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2013).
1 12 See Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae NAACP et al., supra note 87.
113 FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 16 (Apr. 26,
1976) ("Duplication, waste, inertia and ineffectiveness in the intelligence community has
been one of the costs of insulating the intelligence bureaucracy from the rigors of
Congressional and public scrutiny.").
114 See Vindication for Snowden, supra note 65 (ACLU's Ben Wizner, characterizing NSA's
argument: "In other words, we need to have a whole haystack, because one day someone's
going to drop a needle into it.").
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The New York Times and Washington Post reported very early on
in 20o6 that the targeted NSA Program produced lots of bad leads
that were passed on to the FBI for further investigation, resulting in
both dead ends-"more calls to Pizza Hut," in the words of an FBI
agent quoted in the Times' story-and, of course, the lost opportunity
costs of the wasted effort in pursuing those leads to being with.
1 5
(Curiously, the only reason this evidence of the poor practical efficacy
of the NSA Program came out in 2oo6 was likely that natural
interagency rivalries gave the FBI an incentive to leak information to
reporters-a dynamic that seems to have played out between the FBI
and CIA throughout various torture-related FOIA releases.) The
Washington Post has similarly unearthed and published a slide
revealing some of the NSA's current over-collection problems: because
spammers got into an email account the agency was surveilling, the
web of connections from sent emails out of that compromised account
became so huge it was flooding their entire collection system,
eventually forcing NSA to cut off that target from surveillance.
(Perhaps the lesson for civil libertarians here is to periodically click on
those Nigerian emails to protect your Gmail account from
surveillance.) I 6
In 2oo6 only a small handful of dubious success stories were
advertised by the NSA as proof that the Program worked (with claims
that dossiers on amateurish jihadists Mohammed Junaid Babar and
lyman Faris were augmented in part through the program)." 7
Similarly, there are very few examples that the NSA has even tried to
hold out as successes for what are surely multi-billion dollar
programs. The NSA claims that the identification of 2009 subway
bomb plotter Najibullah Zazi traces back to an intercepted email he
sent to the Yahoo account of a known al Qaeda figure in Pakistan-in
other words, an account the pre-2oo7 version of FISA would have
readily facilitated surveillance of, and one already being watched by
115 Lowell Bergman, Eric Lichtblau, Scott Shane and Don Van Natta Jr., Spy Agency Data
After Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2OO6) at Al; Barton Gellman,
Dafna Linzer and Carol D. Leonnig, Surveillance Net Yields Few Suspects, WASH. POST
(Feb. 5, 2oo6), http://wvww.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2oo6/02/04/AR2oo6o2o41373.html.
116 The NSA's Problem? Too Much Data, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-nsas-overcollection-problem/517/.
117 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Defense Lawyers in Terror Cases Plan Challenges
Over Spy Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2005/12/28/politiCs/28legal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o.
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British intelligence." 8 British intelligence also first found David
Coleman Headley, another find claimed for the NSA. NSA claimed the
call records database helped lead them to Basaaly Moalin, convicted of
material support for sending funds to al Shabab; like Zazi, the agency
used a Shabab member's number as the starting point, and could have
done a conventional investigation via particularized court order from
that first clue. Finally, an FBI official told CBS that several Americans,
one of whom plead guilty three years ago to material support for al-
Qaeda, had plotted to bomb the New York Stock Exchange, an attack
detected in advance by NSA-but there is no evidence beyond that
statement that this plot was in any way real." 9 This very thin case for
efficacy is probably why by September, General Alexander had begun
to frequently advertise national "eyber security" as an additional
justification for the mass collection programs, and why the
government had backed off initial aggressive claims about the call
records program's efficacy in court filings later in the fall. 2 ' The first
judicial decision to address the call records program also seems quite
skeptical of its efficacy.'
2
'
Alexander has spoken of the "peace of mind metric ' 22 with respect
to mass surveillance: at least we have everything, even if it's not easy
to use! But even saying that seems in a way an acknowledgment that
the current system doesn't work well. Surely the agency understands
this at some level. Why keep doing it, then? On possibility-which we
proposed even back in 2006-is that the goal of gathering these
ll Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, NYC Bomb Plot Details Settle Little in NSA Debate,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 13, 2013) http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nyc-bomb-plot-details-
settle-little-nsa-debate.
119 Justin Elliott and Theodoric Meyer, Claim on "Attacks Thwarted" by NSA Spreads
Despite Lack of Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 23, 2013), www.propublica.org/article/claim-
on-attacks-thwarted-by-nsa-spreads-despite-lack-of-evidence.
120 See Jameel Jaffer, The Basis for the NSA's Call-Tracking Program Has Disappeared, If
It Ever Existed [Updated], JUST SECURITY (Nov. 7, 2013), available at
http://justsecurity.org/2o13/11/o7/basis-nsas-call-tracking-program-disappeared-
existed/ (noting claims to FISC in 2008 that program was "necessary" have evolved to
program being "one method" that it "may not be feasible" to do without).
121 See Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-o881, 2013 WL 6571596 *1, *24, Slip Op. at 61 (Dec. 16,
2013) ("the Government does not cite a single instance in which analysis of the NSA's bulk
metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the
Government in achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature.")
122 Dave Gonigam, Cybersecurity: The NSA's Big Budget Action Movie, DAILY RECKONING
(Jan. 21, 2014), available at http://dailyreckoning.com/cybersecurity-the-nsas-big-
budget-action-movie/ ("[Alexander said] the NSA needs the ability to spot 'a cyberpacket
that's about to destroy Wall Street."')
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haystacks is to enable the retrospective testing of technologies
developed in the future to sort them. On this theory, these databases
are gathered mainly so as to allow the NSA to test various algorithms
designed to spot possible threats based on nothing more than patterns
of communication-that one call from Afghanistan in the middle of
night followed by ten calls out described supra. Such algorithms can
only really be tested to see if they "work" by running them against a
past database and seeing if they spot threats that proved to exist when
an attack happened or was preempted by more traditional intelligence
gathering and law enforcement techniques.
Such an aspiration would fit into one long-term dream of the
intelligence agencies: to replace the human element of intelligence
operations, which has historically proven to be inherently flaky,
expensive, and prone to working for the enemy, with machine
intelligence-ever-refined until it proves foolproof, the Manchurian
candidate of the intelligence field. The mindset would also be
consistent with the entrepreneurial atmosphere that seems to prevail
within the NSA, based on the Snowden documents: multiple
programs, constantly turning over, competing over similar
functionality, brassily advertising themselves. The revolutionary
promise of "big data" is trumpeted everywhere today, but machine
intelligence might also have seemed like a ready solution to one of the
many intelligence crises posed by 9/11: that we had far too few human
intelligence resources already in place in the Arab world the day after
the attacks.
Such a system, when perfected, would in theory aspire to intercept
as much data of every variety in bulk first and find suspects later,
rather than starting with evidence generating suspicion and
investigating those specific targets-the traditional preemptive law
enforcement model of seeking out the tip of the conspiratorial iceberg
and then throwing more assets at traditional techniques (targeted
intercepts, tailing, infiltration) to uncover the hidden mass below the
waterline. The problem with this aspiration in theory is that it
assumes an algorithm can be found which generates almost no false
positives. An algorithm that produces an infinitesimal rate of false
positives, when applied to a massive database, will overwhelm any
system with "more calls to Pizza Hut." Indeed any algorithm, to be
useful in practice, must produce an almost negligible false positive
rate because the ratio of false positives against hits must be small, and
the number of actual terrorist conspirators in any society is itself
infinitesimal.123
123 See Bruce Schneier, Data Mining for Terrorists, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 9, 2OO6)
("All data mining systems fail in two different ways: false positives and false negatives. A
false positive is when the system identifies a terrorist plot that really isn't one. A false
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I have already noted above that many commentators believe that
because the Fourth Amendment warrant clause and its particularity
requirements are so inherently incompatible with mass surveillance,
such data mining programs will eventually only be reviewed for
"reasonableness" under the first generally-applicable clause of the
Amendment, which states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." But there is also an
antecedent question, which is whether a computer searching your
data without ever flagging it for review by a human operator even
constitutes a "search."' 2 Those who believe the answer is "no" would
likely hold that, if NSA is only exposing a record to scrutiny by human
agents after it has been flagged by a computer algorithm, then the
millions of records the algorithm scans and rejects have not been
searched, and even the reasonableness requirement may not apply to
them. The ACLU call-records plaintiffs base their standing on the fact
that all records of subscribers to their telecom provider have been
turned over to the NSA, including their's. But if all those records have
only been scanned by a computer for ties to one of the 300 target
numbers queried, then under this theory for exempting machine
searches, it is unclear that their records have been "searched" for
Fourth Amendment purposes.'25
Finally, any such system, no matter how sophisticated, would be
easy to avoid if terrorist conspirators simply took a low-tech approach.
negative is when the system misses an actual terrorist plot. Depending on how you "tune"
your detection algorithms, you can err on one side or the other: you can increase the
number of false positives to ensure that you are less likely to miss an actual terrorist plot,
or you can reduce the number of false positives at the expense of missing terrorist plots...
To reduce both those numbers, you need a well-defined profile. And that's a problem when
it comes to terrorism. In hindsight, it was really easy to connect the 9/11 dots and point to
the warning signs, but it's much harder before the fact... assume the system has a 1 in 1oo
false positive rate (99% accurate), and a 1 in 1,ooo false negative rate (99.9% accurate).
Assume one trillion possible indicators to sift through: that's about ten events 11 e-mails,
phone calls, purchases, web surfings, whatever 11 per person in the U.S. per day. Also
assume that 1o of them are actually terrorists plotting. This unrealistically- accurate system
will generate one billion false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers."); Carl Bialik,
Ethics Aside, Is NSA's Spy Tool Efficient?, WALL. ST. J. (June 14, 2013),
http: //online.wsj.comlnewslarticles/SB1ooo 4241278873240495045785435422580548
84; Carl Bialik, Do the Numbers Behind Prism Add Up?, WALL. ST. J. (June 14, 2013 9:53
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/numbersguy/do-the-numbers-behind-prism-add-up-1249/
(citing prediction of 1o,ooo:1 false positive ratio).
124 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531,
547-54 (2005).
125 Judge Leon's decision in Klayman rather summarily dismisses this argument: see
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.Supp.2d 1, 29 n.39 ( D.D.C. 2013).
[V01. 10:2
KADIDAL
Recall that by the afternoon of 9/11 there were already pundits on the
networks announcing that soon the public would hear about how the
plotters pulled it off with encryption. Instead, they used the most
primitive of techniques: staying off-grid, communicating in code when
they did use email (from public computer terminals), etc. 126 As
Newsweek summarized it, "[t]he NSA's top brass assumes that if a
threat does not show up in its databases, it doesn't exist. As one
woman who lives online, Marcy Wheeler, said, the next terrorist attack
will come from a group that stays offline 'and we're going to be hit bad
by it because we have this hubris about the degree to which all people
live online.
2 7
G. Self-help
"Encryption works": 12' no less an authority than the famously-
paranoid Edward Snowden has said as much. 129 While almost all
commercial software packages must be assumed to be vulnerable in
the same way the 256-bit AES encrypted Skype is, simple, negligible-
cost combinations of open-source programs like Jabber (chat) and
Jitsi (video) paired with PGP encryption can replace most commercial
means of electronic communication. Whereas the previous suspicion
that encrypting communications simply flagged them for the NSA
(which, according to some reports, stores all the encrypted
communications it encounters for such date in the future as
computing power makes it more convenient to decode them), one
126 In fairness, Zazi did as well, but got caught, his email correspondent already being a
marked man and his choice of code words too commonplace. See Goldman and Apuzzo,
supra note 118.
127 Pema Levy, The Woman Who Knows NSA's Secrets Trawling for Needles in A
Haystack (Oct. 04, 2013) NEWSWEEK, available at
http://mag.newsweek.Com/2o13/1O/O4/the-woman-who-knows-the-nsa-s-secrets.html.
128 Edward Snowden: NSA Whistleblower Answers Reader Questions, THE GUARDIAN
(June 17, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/jun/17/edward-snowden-nsa-
files-whistleblower ("Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are
one of the few things that you can rely on. Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically
weak that NSA can frequently find ways around it.").
129 See also Bruce Schneier, Snowden, the NSA, and Free Software -Bruce Schneier +
Eben Moglen (Dec. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pURimA&feature=youtu.be ("the most
important headline is that crypto works"; to the extent that reporting notes instances on
NSA supposedly breaking encrypted systems, "[t]hey're not breaking it by breaking the
math, they're breaking it by cheating"-i.e. by weakening random number generators,
penetrating internal transfers at unencrypted points, etc.).
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consequence of Snowden's revelations will likely be that larger
numbers of commercial and noncommercial users routinely encrypt
electronic communications. At the very least, encryption buys time
against the government.
30
H. Statutory limits, Congressional self-interest, and some concluding
thoughts
While I have voiced skepticism about the potential for FISC
reform to significantly affect our current situation, Congress could
certainly impose meaningful limits on the NSA by statute. It could
revoke the broad authority granted by the FAA, impose a warrant
progress for government access to third-party records, bar long-term
storage of data-almost every problem noted above could be addressed
by statute. FISA itself occupied an effectively unregulated space when
it was passed in 1978. Nor is it fantasy to think such things might
happen in the near term. The first post-Snowden bill, pushed by
Representatives Amash, Conyers and Nadler in the House, came close
to passing,1 31 and some Tea Party libertarians seem to be promising (if
unfamiliar) bedfellows for them on these issues.
That brings me to one final thought on checks-and-balances: To
what extent are judges, members of Congress and other elected
officials exempted from NSA surveillance? If they are not, the chilling
effect that afflicts attorneys and journalists applies here as well and
has similarly-enormous potential to corrupt the political process.
Imagine Anthony Weiner had not accidentally mass-tweeted that
fateful photograph, 32 and had remained in the House, but knew that
130 Steven Rich and Barton Gellman, NSA Seeks to Build Quantum Computer that could
Crack Most Types of Encryption, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-
computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195- 1e3-
8def-a3301492df2 story.html ("'I don't think we're likely to have the type of quantum
computer the NSA wants within at least five years, in the absence of a significant
breakthrough maybe much longer' (quoting MIT's Seth Lloyd)); id. ("In 2009, computer
scientists using classical methods were able to discover the primes within a 768-bit
number, but it took almost two years and hundreds of computers to factor it. The scientists
estimated that it would take 1,ooo times longer to break a 1,024-bit encryption key, which
is commonly used for online transactions.").
131 See Jonathan Weisman, House Defeats Effort to Rein In N.SA. Data Gathering, N.Y.
TIMES (July 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/us/polities/house-defeats-
effort-to-rein-in-nsa-data-gathering.html? r=o.
132 See Weinergate, THE VILLAGE VOICE (May 26, 2011),
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/weinergate%2odick%2oshot.png.
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the NSA knew about his habits-and was casting the deciding vote on a
bill limiting the powers of the NSA?
Such a scenario is not entirely the stuff of fiction: FBI director J.
Edgar Hoover had accumulated dossiers on all sorts of elected
officials, which is why James Comey's term in that same office has
been limited to ten years by statute-to avoid allowing any future FBI
director to accumulate that much dirt on (and accompanying passive
leverage over) Congressmen.'33 Even Supreme Court justices had been
surveilled in the past, as the Church Committee discovered.'34 Perhaps
one consequence of the accumulation of private conversations from
foreign leaders' cell phones and email accounts will be not to
undermine their negotiating positions at the G2o or the UN directly,
but to allow the accumulation of leverage by discovering embarrassing
secrets in their closets. Either way, the potential for surveillance
corrupting the political process extends to multinational negotiations
between democracies as well.
Interestingly, Snowden did a two-hour-long live chat with
Guardian readers from Hong Kong, which he ended by noting (in
response to Glenn Greenwald's final "anything else you'd like to add"
question) that: "The US Person/foreigner distinction is not a
reasonable substitute for individualized suspicion, and is only applied
to improve [political] support for the program. This is the precise
reason that NSA provides Congress with a special immunity to its
surveillance. "1
3
"
Snowden's first sentence neatly summarizes the polling data I
described earlier. 36 The second illustrates the potential scope for
corruption of the democratic process posed by sweeping content and
133 Pornography-vieing habits are in fact a special area of interest for the NSA with
respect to "jihadist" "radicalizers": see Glenn Greenwald, Ryan Gallagher, and Ryan Grim,
Top-Secret Document Reveals NSA Spied On Porn Habits As Part Of Plan To Discredit
'Radicalizers', HUFFINGTON POST (updated Dec. 2, 2013),
http://vww.huffingtonpost.Com/2o13/11/26/nsa-porn-
muslims n 4346128.html?1385526024.
134 See generally Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and His Secrets 630-31 (2001).
135 Edward Snowden: NSA whistleblower answers reader questions, supra note 128.
136 Indeed, if the main reason for the foreigner/U.S.-person distinction is domestic political
optics (and not legal principle or technical issues), one would presume changing political
winds and diplomatic pressures might make NSA willing to abandon this fundamental
distinction that traces back to the origins of FISA. Cf. Jennifer Granick, Foreigners and the
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metadata surveillance, whether or not Congress is exempted from
some or all of it. Mass surveillance of this all-seeing scale, with the
government able to assemble together everything about us that exists
outside of our heads-all of our consumer activities, all of our
communication patterns and other social connection-is arguably
fundamentally incompatible with democratic self-governance. One
reason the Framers paid so much attention to protecting property
rights from the state is that they thought private property ensured
autonomy from the state; give the government sufficient power to
control wealth and the means to produce it, and the people would not
be independent enough to control the government. Essentially, to
have a democracy, you need the citizenry to be somewhat autonomous
from government, independent of all-encompassing government
control. Mass surveillance threatens that independence enough to
corrupt democracy itself. When the government "can literally see your
thoughts form as you type,"'37 your degree of control over government
is at the very least limited by the same sort of self-censorship that
afflicts the lawyers and journalists who first sued over these NSA
Program in 2oo6.
I think voters today actually understand that at some deep level.
So that makes it strange that the most commonplace excuse for not
caring about mass surveillance is that old saw: "ordinary Americans
have nothing to fear." And I suppose at some level, that's just it: The
existence of a program like this is a tremendous disincentive to
participate in anything this government does not like, or, for the more
far-sighted, that some future government may not like. 38 Put another
way, it's a huge incentive to become more ordinary in one's political,
socioeconomic, and even religious beliefs. Why go to an animal rights
conference, join a Google group of like-minded people opposed to the
WTO, protest the next war in the streets, knowing that tomorrow the
government may regard these associations as suspect and track them
back to you? The most succinct statement of the homogenizing
potential of such an all-seeing government was made by Umair
137 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-
us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/o6/o6/3aocoda8-cebf-iie2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html.
138But Cf. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 114 (Dec. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2 13-12-12_rg final-report.pdf ("we
cannot discount the risk, in light of the lessons of our own history, that at some point in the
future, high-level government officials will decide that this massive database of
extraordinarily sensitive private information is there for the plucking.").
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Haque, who asked: "Can there be a more chilling message
to conform than 'America is not interested in spying on ordinary
people'?'
139
139 Umair Haque, TWITFER (Aug. 9, 2013, 7:59 PM),
https://twitter.com/umairh/status/366o31o32337698816 (@umairh: "Can there be a
more chilling message to conform than 'America is not interested in spying on ordinary
people'?"). (It seems appropriate at this point to mention that the Library of Congress is
apparently archiving all of Twitter. See Library of Congress Is Archiving All Of America's
Tweets, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 22, 2013)).
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